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Abstract
This paper presents a monetary model with nominal rigidities and maximizing, rational,
forward-looking households, intermediaries and ﬁrms. It differs from conventional models
in this class in two key respects. First, price (and wage) setters set pricing policies, including
an updating rate for future prices, instead of price levels. Second, output ﬂuctuations during
the period of a pricing policy are costly to ﬁrms.
The paper is motivated by some important shortcomings of conventional models, namely
their inability to generate inﬂation inertia, inﬂation persistence and recessionary disinﬂations
without introducing either an ad-hoc updating rule or learning. While learning is clearly im-
portant, we are interested in the contribution that structural rigidities can make in a forward-
looking and optimizing model. The model does generate all of the above effects in response
to monetary policy shocks. The channel for these effects in the model is the long-run or
inﬂation updating component of ﬁrms’ pricing policies. This is distinct from another fre-
quently stressed reason for inﬂation inertia and persistence, a slow response of marginal cost
to shocks, which is also present in our model because all components of marginal cost, not
just wages, are sticky. In work in progress, we are estimating the model using Bayesian
techniques.
The authors thank Ariel Burstein, Guillermo Calvo, Chris Erceg and Andrew Levin for very
helpful comments.1 INTRODUCTION
Ag r o w i n gb o d yo fr e s e a r c hi nm o n e t a r yt h e o r yu s e st h ea s s u m p t i o no fn o m i n a l
rigidities embedded in dynamic general equilibrium models with rational expectations.
Comprehensive surveys of this literature can be found in Gal´ ı (2001) and Lane (2001).
The resurgence of this model class is based both on much improved theoretical foundations
and on empirical arguments. The time-dependent price adjustment formulations of
Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983) made it possible to incorporate
nominal rigidities into rational expectations models with forward-looking optimizing agents.
Empirical support came from evidence showing that monetary policy has signiﬁcant short-
run real effects, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, 1998) and Leeper, Sims
and Zha (1996).
Many authors
1 argue that models with nominal rigidities can successfully account for
most of the effects of monetary policy. But whether these models can fully account for
all short-run empirical properties of inﬂation and output has recently been much debated.
Mankiw (2001) notes that they do not generate the empirically observed delayed and gradual
response of inﬂation to monetary policy shocks, a phenomenon that we will refer to as
inﬂation inertia. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) show that they also do not generate the observed
very prolonged steady state deviations of inﬂation following a monetary policy shock, a
phenomenon that is generally referred to as inﬂation persistence. In short, these are models
of stickiness in price levels, but they imply no stickiness in inﬂation. This in turn implies that
disinﬂationary policies have minimal real costs, or even that anticipated disinﬂations cause
booms (Ball, 1994a). This is also inconsistent with a large body of empirical evidence (see
e.g. Gordon 1982, 1997) which shows that disinﬂationary policies give rise to recessions,o r
more speciﬁcally to a U-shaped output response. These empirical regularities are typically
presented using VAR impulse responses such as the ones displayed in Figure 1 for the US
1 See Taylor (1998) and Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999).
2case, showing the response of the nominal interest rate, inﬂation and output to a one standard
deviation monetary policy shock.
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Figure 1 : VAR Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
One key ingredient of the model we propose in this paper is a tractable generalization of
the Calvo (1983) staggered pricing model ﬁrst introduced by Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof
(2001, 2002). Ourmodelcontainstheconventionalstaggeredpricingmodelasaspecialcase.
But it is also capable of generating inﬂation inertia, inﬂation persistence and recessionary
disinﬂations. Its main difference to conventional treatments is in its speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’
price setting behavior. We suggest that, in the realistic case of a positive steady state inﬂation
rate, it is more plausible to assume that ﬁrms employ pricing policies instead of setting only a
price level. The purpose of such policies is to keep them as close as possible to their steadily
increasing ﬂexible price optimum between the times at which price changing opportunities
arrive. To keep the model tractable, we speciﬁcally assume that once a ﬁrm gets the chance
to change its pricing policy, it jointly and optimally chooses an initial price level and an
2 This is a recursive VAR with quarterly data from 1960:2 through 2000:4. The ordering
and data are standard: Inﬂation (CPI growth rate), output (Hodrick-Prescott detrended real
per capita GDP) and the interest rate (Fed Funds rate). The results are very similar to Stock
and Watson (2001). The initial values shown for the interest rate and inﬂation are the sample averages.
3unconditional rate at which it will update its price in the future, a ‘ﬁrm-speciﬁci n ﬂation
rate’.
We motivate this speciﬁcation by appealing to costs of reoptimization, such as costs of
information gathering, decision making, negotiation and communication. The empirical
evidence presented by Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta and Bergen (2004) emphasizes the
importance of reoptimization costs relative to menu costs (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), the
most common motivation for nominal rigidities. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001)
describe price setting behavior under reoptimization costs as follows: ‘...in the presence of
these costsﬁrmsfullyoptimizepricesonlyperiodically, andfollowsimplerulesfor changing
their prices at other times.’ In the existing literature there are two dominant approaches to
specifying such a simple rule. In one (Woodford, 2002) ﬁrms choose only a price level
without updating. In the other (Yun, 1996) ﬁrms still choose only a price level but update
their prices at the steady state inﬂation rate at all times. But under both of these approaches
only the aggregate price level is sticky while inﬂation is ﬂexible. Credible disinﬂations
therefore do not cause recessions.
By contrast, when ﬁrms employ pricing policies of the kind we propose, an unexpected
and permanent decline in the steady state inﬂation rate targeted by monetary policy entails a
slow inﬂation response and output losses, even if the change in policy is perfectly credible.
Less persistent monetary policy shocks also give rise to much more inertia than observed in
conventional speciﬁcations. There are two main reasons for the slow inﬂation response. The
ﬁrst is the continuing effect of historic pricing decisions. The economy initially contains a
large number of ﬁrms that have chosen their price updating rates under the previous policy,
and the weighted average of such updating rates is an important component of aggregate
inﬂation. Intuitively, because it is costly for ﬁrms to be continuously informed about
monetary conditions, it takes time for their periodic inﬂationary updating to fully reﬂect
the stance of monetary policy on inﬂation. The second reason for the slow inﬂation response
is the behavior of new price setters. The spread between ﬁrms’ initially chosen price and
4the aggregate price level, or ‘front loading’, is the second component of aggregate inﬂation.
Because ﬁrms have the option of updating their prices, front loading will respond very little
to the policy change, contributing further to the sluggishness of the inﬂation response. This
effect is very much reinforced in our modelb yt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a ti ti sc o s t l yf o rﬁrms to
experience highly time-varying output levels throughout the duration of a pricing policy. A
small quadratic cost of excessive output volatility is enough to make ﬁrms adjust mostly their
inﬂation updating rate instead of their initial price level. This has the advantage of avoiding
another difﬁculty of the Calvo-Yun model pointed outb yB a k s h ie ta l .( 2 0 0 3 ) ,n a m e l yt h a ti f
steady state inﬂation is signiﬁcant ﬁrms in that model will choose price paths that generate
very large ﬂuctuations in demand and therefore output. Finally, the real interest rate increase
induced by the slow inﬂation response gives rise to a recession.
The motivation for our pricing speciﬁcation
3 is similar to that of Mankiw andReis (2002).
These authors present a model where price setters are assumed to be able to reset their
price every period, but receive information only at random intervals. This is equivalent to
assuming that ﬁrms choose a price path, and it generates predictions that qualitatively match
important features of the data. The drawback is that the model’s microeconomic foundations
are not fully laid out, which makes it harder to explore its quantitative predictions and their
sensitivity to the values of structural parameters.
4
The literature related to inﬂation inertia also encompasses models of backward-looking
behavior, imperfect credibility, learning and supply side rigidities. Until quite recently the
literature mostly relied on speciﬁcations that were not explicitly built on forward-looking
optimizing behavior. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) present a relative real wage model, while
Ghezzi (2001) and Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) modify the Calvo (1983) model to allow
3 See Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2001) for the original statement.
4 Burstein (2002) provides a general equilibrium model with microeconomic foundations
that is related to Mankiw and Reis (2002). However, it is a nonlinear model and complex to
solve. We will argue below that concentrating on linear pricing policies is both reasonable
and advantageous for quantitative model evaluation.
5for a share of price setters to be backward looking, in the sense of using a rule of thumb
that depends on lagged inﬂation. A well-known explanation for inﬂation inertia during
disinﬂations is lack of credibility, see the papers by Ball (1995) and Calvo and Vegh (1993).
However, in many countries where disinﬂations were costly the monetary authority enjoyed
a high degree of credibility, as argued by Ball (1994b). This is therefore only a suitable
explanation for a limited number of cases. Models of learning about monetary policy have
recently become popular, and clearly such models do give rise to inﬂation inertia because
the contain an element of backward-looking behavior. Two examples are Woodford (2001)
and Erceg and Levin (2003). Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) generate inﬂation
and output inertia in a rational expectations model by introducing a number of nominal and
real supply side rigidities. Their most successful model variant does however still rely on a
backward-looking price and wage indexation scheme.
The future plan for this research agenda is as follows. The rational expectations model is
completely laid out in this paper, and we show by way of an example that it generates a very
high degree of inﬂation persistence even with a modest degree of price stickiness. We plan to
nestthismodelwithaKalman-ﬁltertypelearningmechanism, giventhatlearningiscurrently
the most popular explanation for inﬂation inertia. Our plan is to compare the relative roles
of learning and of forward-looking optimizing behavior constrained by structural rigidities,
by estimating the model using Bayesian techniques. The model’s structure on the real side is
very similar to Juillard et al. (2004), apart from price setting where there are big differences.
We will therefore follow a similar estimation strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 contains a preliminary comparison of the performance of the two models. Section 4
concludes.
62T H E M O D E L
The economy consists of a continuum of measure one of identical price-taking inﬁnitely-
lived households indexed by i ∈ [0,1], a continuum of monopolistically competitive
inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1], a continuum of monopolistically competitive
inﬁnitely-lived ﬁnancial intermediaries indexed by z ∈ [0,1] and a government.
2.1 Households
Household i maximizes lifetime utility, which depends on his per capita consumption Ci
t,
leisure 1 − Li
t (where 1 is the ﬁxed time endowment and Lt is total labor supply), and real
money balances Mi


































Throughout, shocks are denoted by Sx
t ,w h e r ex is the sector subject to the shock.
Households exhibit habit persistence with respect to Ci









t is a CES aggregator over individual varieties ci
t(j), with time-varying
























Capital accumulation follows time-to-build technologies, with a six-period lag between
the investment decision Ii
t and the point at which the investment decision leads to an addition
to the productive capital stock:
K
i





7Furthermore, changes in the level of investment spending are subject to a quadratic
adjustment cost paid out of household income. Each investment decision represents a
commitment to a spending plan over six periods, starting in the period of the decision and
ending one period before capital becomes productive. The shares of the investment project
that have to be disbursed in each period are given by ωj,j=0 ,...,5,w i t hΣ5
j=0ωj =1 .
Actual investment spending Ji
















In addition to money households hold one period nominal government bonds Bt with
gross nominal return it.
5 Their income consists of nominal wage income Wi
tLi
t,n o m i n a l
returns to capital Rk
tKi
t, lump-sum proﬁt redistributions from ﬁrms
R 1
0 Πt(j)dj,a n dl u m p -
sum transfers from the government Ptτt. Expenditure consists of consumption spending
PtCi
t, investment spending PtJi
t, and quadratic adjustment costs on the capital stock. The











































We assume complete contingent claims markets for labor income, and identical initial
endowments of capital, bonds and money. Then all optimality conditions will be the same
across households, except for labor supply. We therefore drop the superscript i.T h eﬁrst-























t+1 = λt (10)
5 All interest and inﬂation rates will be expressed in gross terms.
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We will return to the household’s wage setting problem at a later point, as we will be
able to exploit analogies with the ﬁrms’ price setting. Linearized ﬁrst-order conditions are
presented in a separate Technical Appendix (available on request).
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Cost Minimization
Each ﬁrm j ∈ [0,1] sells a distinct product variety. Heterogeneity in price setting
decisions and therefore in demand for individual products arises because each ﬁrm receives
its price changing opportunities at different, random points in time. Following Calvo (1983)
it is assumed that these opportunities follow a geometric distribution, so that the probability
(1 − δ) of a ﬁrm’s receiving a new opportunity is independent of how long ago it was last
able to change its price. It is also independent across ﬁrms, so that it is straightforward to
determine the aggregate distribution of prices.

















t(j)dj and Lt =
R 1
0 lt(j)dj,w h e r e














labor production function with time varying elasticity of substitution σw
t . Capital, as we
















, a CES capital production function with constant elasticity







,a n dw e
deﬁne the auxiliary variable ˜ Yt =
R 1
0 yt(j)dj. It is straightforward to show that the steady
state values and the log-deviations from steady state of the last two variables are equal. Then,
given that factor markets are competitive so that all ﬁrms face identical costs of hiring capital
and labor, we can derive the following aggregate input demand conditions:
Lt =( 1− α)
mct
wt






Each ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of real proﬁts. The ﬁrst two
determinants of proﬁt are real revenue Pt+k(j)yt+k(j)/Pt+k and real marginal cost
mct+kyt+k(j). The two key differences between our model and other models of nominal
rigidities in rational expectations settings concern ﬁrst the manner in which ﬁrms set their
prices when they receive an opportunity to do so, and second the cost of setting prices far
away from prevailing average market prices Pt.L e tu sﬁr s tt u r nt ot h el a t t e r .A ss h o w nb y
Bakshi et al. (2003), conventional price-setting in a Calvo-Yun type model implies that ﬁrms
optimally choose prices that imply a very large variability in demand and therefore output.
It is clear that such variab i l i t yi sv e r yc o s t l yt oﬁrms for a variety of reasons, including
difﬁculties in customer and supplier relationships. We therefore assume that ﬁr m sf a c ea
small quadratic cost of deviating from the output level of its average competitor, meaning
the ﬁrm that charges the current market average price. Such costs make no difference in
Calvo-Yun type models because of the rigidity of the assumed pricing policy available to
10ﬁrms, namely the fact that ﬁrms can only choose a new price level once and thereafter need
to either keep their price level constant or update it at the steady state inﬂation rate. However,
in conjunction with our more ﬂexible assumptions about pricing, quadratic costs lead to a
dramatically improved performance of the model in terms of its ability to generate inﬂation
persistence in response to shocks.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that when a ﬁrm j gets an opportunity to decide on its pricing
policy, it chooses both its current price level V
j
t and the rate v
j
t at which it will update its
price from today onwards until the time it is next allowed to change its policy.
6 At any time








Firms discount proﬁts expected in period t + k by the k-period ahead real intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution and by δ
k, the probability that their period t pricing policy will
still be in force k periods from t. They take into account households’ demand for their output






























Note that the ﬁrm speciﬁc superscript j can be dropped because all ﬁr m st h a tg e tap r i c e
changing opportunity at time t will behave identically. We deﬁne the front-loading term for
price setting, the ratio of a new price setter’s ﬁrst period price to the market average price, as
pt ≡ Vt/Pt, cumulative aggregate inﬂation as Πt,k ≡
Qk
j=1 πt+j for k ≥ 1( ≡ 1 for k =0 ) ,
6 Weemphasizethatourmodellingof nominalrigidities buildsinless ad-hocbehavior thantheCalvo-Yun
model, because it imposes fewer exogenous constraints on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem.
7 As for the possibility of more general price paths, we would argue that it is natural to focus on
equilibria characterized by a constant steady state growth rate of the nominal anchor. The model can then be
solved by linearizing around that steady state, in which case it is sufﬁcient to allow ﬁrms
to specify their pricing policies up to the growth rate of their price path. This permits the
use of conventional solution methods, which makes quantitative analysis much more straightforward.
11and the mark-up term as µt = σt
σt−1.T h e nt h eﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions for the choice of







































The intuition for this result becomes much clearer once the conditions are linearized. As
this is algebraically very involved, the details are presented in the Technical Appendix. We
discuss the key equations here. They replace the traditional one-equation representation of
aggregate inﬂation through a New Keynesian Phillips curve with a three-equation system in
ˆ πt, ˆ vt a n da ni n e r t i a lv a r i a b l eˆ ψt deﬁned as




kˆ vt−1−k . (21)
This is, in deviation form, the weighted average of all those past ﬁrm-speciﬁci n ﬂation
rates that are still in force between periods t−1 and t, and which therefore enter into period




ˆ pt + ˆ ψt . (22)
This is a key equation, because its two components reﬂect the two main sources of
inﬂation inertia. Following a monetary policy shock, the continuing effects of price updating
decisions made under the old monetary policy are represented by ˆ ψt, and this is the main
source of inertia in aggregate inﬂation. In addition, if a monetary policy shock is very
persistent then new price setters respond mainly through changes in their updating rates.
In that case front-loading ˆ pt responds very little, thereby generating further inertia.
But if monetary policy shocks are not very persistent, it turns out that inﬂation dynamics
can nevertheless be dominated by the front-loading term - in effect, ﬁrms choose to behave
like Calvo-Yun price setters even though they can also choose their price updating rate.
12However this behavior, as we discussed, implies very large ﬂuctuations in demand and
therefore output. The introduction of only a very small quadratic adjustment cost of such
ﬂuctuations is then enough to make ﬁrms behave very differently. Consider the example of
a temporary disinﬂationary shock, starting from a signiﬁcantly positive steady state inﬂation
rate. A Calvo-Yun type price setter would respond to such a shock by setting his initial
price well below the market price and would then let it grow (as he is assumed not to have a
choice in that matter) at the steady state inﬂation rate so that eventually his price would be
well above the market average. The ﬂuctuations in his demand would be dramatic given the
elasticities of substitution typically assumed in this type of model. Costs of deviating from
market average output would make almost no difference to this argument. Now consider a
ﬁrm that is given more ﬂexibility in price setting by also having the option of adjusting its
price updating rate. During a temporary disinﬂation it could lower that updating rate, which
would allow it to stay much closer to market average prices both on impact and during the
entire duration of the price contract. Doing so would avoid the extreme and costly output
ﬂuctuations it would otherwise experience. In an economy populated by such ﬁrms the term
ˆ ψt is the dominant driving force of aggregate inﬂation. For the reasons mentioned above,
inﬂation will therefore by much more inertial.
Household nominal wage setting follows the same pattern as just discussed, the only
major difference being that mct is replaced by mrst/wt.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
We assume that all capital is intermediated by a continuum of intermediaries indexed by
z ∈ [0,1]. They are competitive in their input market, renting capital Kt from households
at rental rate rk
t. On the other hand, they are monopolistically competitive in their output
market, lending capital varieties kz
t to ﬁrms at rental rates uz
t. This gives rise to sluggish
user costs of capital, which play a similar role in the model to sticky wages in labor markets.
Taken together, sticky wages and sticky user costs make marginal cost react sluggishly to
13shocks, and this can translate to sluggish responses in inﬂation. In preliminary calibrations
of the model this channel however seems less powerful than ﬁrms’ price setting behavior
combined with quadratic costs of output volatility. The ﬁnal word on the two transmission
channels will come in the Bayesian estimation. If sticky user cost is not important in the
data, they will hopefully tell us so.
Every ﬁrm j must use composite capital, a CES aggregate of the varieties supplied
































The proﬁt maximization problem of the intermediary is similar to (18). We deﬁne
the gross intermediation spread as st = ut/rk
t, the gross rate of change of user cost as
πk
t = ut/ut−1, with cumulative rate of change Πk
t,i similar to ﬁrms above, and we deﬁne the
















































































The linearized FOC for this problem are exactly analogous to those for ﬁrm price setting,
with two modiﬁcations. First, the term c mct is replaced with −ˆ st, and second the mark-up µk
is assumed to not be time-varying.
2.4 Government
The government’s ﬁscal policy is assumed to be Ricardian. In particular, we assume that
the government budget is balanced period by period through lump-sum taxes/transfers, and






















The ﬁrst two components on the right-hand side equal the steady state gross nominal
interest rate. The inﬂation target ¯ π is an integral part of the speciﬁcation of monetary policy,
and permanent monetary policy shocks will be modeled as permanent changes in ¯ π.T h e
central bank interest rate response to expected deviations of inﬂation from its steady state
v a l u eh a st h er e s p o n s ec o e f ﬁcient ρ. The response coefﬁcient θ applies to the output gap.
Finally, Sint
t is a zero mean autocorrelated monetary policy shock
8 with law of motion
A government policy is deﬁned as a set of stochastic processes {is,τs}
∞
s=t such that, given
stochastic processes {Ms,P s,y s,Sint
s }
∞
s=t, the conditions (25) and (26) hold for all s ≥ t.
2.5 Equilibrium
An allocation is given by {Bs,M s,c s,L s,k s,y s,c s(j),l s(j),k s(j),y s(j),j∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t,
















s ,µ s,µ w
s
ª∞
s=t. Then equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
An equilibrium is an allocation, a price system, a government policy and shock processes
such that
(a) given the government policy, the price system and shock processes, the allocation
solves the household’s problem of maximizing (1) subject to (7),
(b) given the government policy, shock processes, the restrictions on price setting, and
8 Such shocks, apart from capturing deliberate decisions to deviate temporarily and possibly
persistently from a systematicrule, may also represent theeffectson interest ratesof autocorrelatedinﬂation
forecast errors. We thank Charles Goodhart for emphasizing this point to us.
15the sequences {Ps,MC s,Y s}
∞




s=0 solve ﬁrms’ problem
of maximizing (18),
(c) the goods market clears for all goods and at all times,
(d) the labor market clears at all times,
(e) the market for capital clears at all times,
(f) the bond market clears at all times.
3M A C R O E C O N O M I C D Y N A M I C S
We calibrate parameter values for the quarterly frequency. We assume a degree of price
stickiness of only δ =0 .5 for prices, and similarly for wages and user costs of capital. This
implies an average contract length of two quarters. The parameter determining the quadratic
cost of output volatility is in all cases set to be small at 0.1. The intertemporal elasticity of
substitution γ is assumed to equal 0.5.
9 The proportion of time spent working in steady state
¯ L =1 /3 is based on the evidence cited in Kydland (1995). The value for the habit parameter
ν =0 .72 is close to Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). We follow the literature in
assuming β =0 .99. Our parameter choices for the monetary policy rule are ρ =1 .5 and
θ =0 .5 for inﬂation and output, and an interest rate smoothing parameter of ξ =0 .5.A sf o r
the shock processes, we choose the AR1-coefﬁcient of monetary policy shocks to be equal
to 0.8.
We solve the model by DYNARE, and use impulse responses to display the dynamic
responseoftheeconomytoa50basispointsmonetarypolicyshock. Theresultsareshownin
Figure 2. Inﬂation exhibits both a very gradual initial response, inertia, and a very prolonged
deviation from its (new) steady state, persistence. This is ﬁrst because of the continuing
effect of pricing decisions taken under the old, higher inﬂation monetary regime, and second
because front-loading responds very little. The latter is due to the quadratic cost of output
9 See e.g. Hansen and Singleton (1996).
16volatility. The inﬂa t i o nd e v i a t i o nf r o ms t e a d ys t a t ea n dt h eh i g hr e s p o n s ec o e f ﬁcient to
such deviations in the monetary policy rule imply that nominal interest rates initially stay
very high, and more importantly that there is a steep rise in the real interest rate. This causes
consumption, output and therefore labor demand to drop, i.e. we observe the recession that is
associated with disinﬂations in the data. This in turn lowers real marginal cost, which exerts
downward pressure on prices so that inﬂation begins to fall. At the same time the recession
induces lower nominal interest rates through the monetary policy rule. The combination
of these two effects starts to lower real interest rates, and once this process is complete
the recession ends and inﬂation drops to its new target. An output sacriﬁce is therefore
unavoidable in bringing down inﬂation.
Because following the fairly persistent monetary policy shock aggregate inﬂation is
expected to be lower than its initial value for some time, ﬁrms have an incentive to change the
long-run component of their pricing policies, thereby delaying the instantaneous response of
inﬂation. This reason for inertia is different from the one that is commonly stressed in the
literature, which relies on a slow response of marginal cost to shocks. Of course the latter
is also present in our model, and our ﬁnal estimation will pay attention to the contribution
that this makes. But preliminary results from simulating the model without our price setting





















































Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
184C O N C L U S I O N
This paper presents a monetary model with nominal rigidities and maximizing, rational,
forward-looking households, intermediaries and ﬁrms. It differs from conventional models
in this class in two key respects. First, ﬁrms set pricing policies, inc l u d i n ga nu p d a t i n gr a t e
for future prices, instead of price levels. Second, output ﬂuctuations during the period of a
pricing policy are costly to ﬁrms.
The paper is motivated by some important shortcomings of conventional models, namely
their inability to generate inﬂation inertia, inﬂation persistence and recessionary disinﬂations
without introducing either an ad-hoc updating rule or learning. While learning is clearly
important, we are interested in the contribution that structural rigidities can make in a
forward-looking and optimizing model. The model does generatea l lo ft h ea b o v ee f f e c t si n
response to monetary policy shocks. The channel for these effects in the model is the long-
run or inﬂation updating component of ﬁrms’ pricing policies. This is distinct from another
frequently stressed reason for inﬂation inertia and persistence, a slow response of marginal
cost to shocks, which is also present in our model because all components of marginal cost,
n o tj u s tw a g e s ,a r es t i c k y .
We are currently nesting the above model with a Kalman-ﬁlter learning mechanism, and
are in the process of estimating that model. Our aim is to establish the relative importance of
learning versus structural rigidities in a fully-optimizing rational expectations model. Also,
within the rational expectations model, we will analyze the relative contributions of sticky
marginal costs and the type of pricing policies we propose.
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